On the CJEU’s post-Brexit case-law on European citizenship. The recovery of the identity Ariadne’s thread? by Silveira, Alessandra
UNIO - EU Law Jounal. Vol. 3, No. 1, January 2017, pp 48-62.
®2017 Centre of  Studies in European Union Law
School of  Law – University of  Minho 
On the CJEU’s post-Brexit case-law on European 
citizenship. The recovery of  the identity Ariadne’s thread?
Alessandra Silveira*
ABSTRACT: The CJEU over the years has helped to forge a concept of  citizenship directed to 
be the “fundamental status of  the nationals of  the Member States”. However, since the Dereci 
ruling  of  2011, the proactivity of  the CJEU concerning the development of  European citizenship 
seemed to have gradually exhausted itself, mostly as far as the so-called social citizenship. It happens, 
nonetheless, that this crucial moment the European Union faces demands the enhancement of  
its vertical relation with the citizenry – it is either this or fragmentation. And perhaps this is 
the subliminal message from the CJEU in three post-Brexit rulings that, decided in the Grand 
Chamber, surprisingly recover and develop the most emblematic case-law about the European 
citizenship – namely the Rottmann and Zambrano rulings – whose political potential and/or 
identity potential seemed irrevocably muzzled. The rulings Rendón Marín, CS and Petruhhin 
point to the connection between European citizenship and the fundamental rights protection in 
the EU and possibly even represent an attempt to recover the identity dimension of  European 
citizenship, nourished by a sense of  belonging to a community of  rights and obligations.
KEYWORDS: EU citizenship – identity – fundamental rights – CJEU.
* Director of  the Centre of  Studies in EU Law (CEDU) of  the University of  Minho and Jean Monnet 
Chair in EU Law.
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 3, No. 1, January 2017
49 Alessandra Silveira
I. From the Union based on the rule of  law to the political 
Union: the political/identity potential of  citizenship
It is not worth preserving illusions: the European Union as we knew it has 
ceased existing after Brexit. The unexpected result of  the referendum, in spite of  the 
manipulation and abuse which so embarrassingly preceded it, has been converted into 
the symbol of  popular exhaustion concerning the absence of  consistent responses to 
the problems that affect individuals’ everyday life. This crucial moment that the Union 
faces demands the enhancement of  its vertical relation with the citizenry – it is either 
this or fragmentation. The legal basis for such is found in Article 9 of  the Treaty on 
the European Union (TEU). According to it, the Union respects the principle of  the 
equality of  its citizens in all its activities, from which it follows that they should benefit 
from equal attention and treatment by the European institutions, organs and organisms. 
The concept of  nationality naturally creates this vertical relation between citizens and 
the public power, based on a sentiment of  belonging to a certain political community 
which is reflected in the idea of  identity. Yet, such verticality may also exist coming 
from the status of  the Union citizenship, with the perk of  this being objective whilst 
nationality is subjective. Hence, through fundamental rights protection it is possible to 
establish that vertical relation between citizens and the European public power.
All in all, European citizenship has always been related to the imperative of  
equality of  nationals from the different Member States – who must enjoy rights and 
be subject to the same obligations provided for in the Treaties. Inextricably bound 
to the fundamental rights protection,1 European citizenship has offered the legal 
basis for plugging the gaps of  protection – and, in that regard, to the deepening of  
the integration process. Conceived as a market citizenship (focused on the rights of  
economic actors that moved), it soon evolved to a social citizenship (focused on the 
dimensions of  social solidarity associated with the exercise of  the economic freedoms), 
in order to reach prospectively a republican citizenship (founded upon the secure 
exercise of  fundamental rights and the active involvement of  the citizens). Thus, more 
than a status in a static perspective, the European citizenship started being noticed as a 
process of  juridical-constitutional range.2 That is why authors in general had difficulties 
sizing it up in terms of  legal doctrine.
And to this evolution came a large contribution from the Court of  Justice of  
the European Union (CJEU) that over time has shaped a concept of  European 
citizenship aimed at being the “fundamental status of  the nationals of  the Member States”3 – 
a status which would allow them to obtain, regardless their nationality, the same legal 
treatment. Therefore, being an EU citizen essentially makes one the holder of  rights 
protected in the EU legal order, including fundamental rights. In this sense, one 
might argue that the substance of  EU citizenship is based on the fundamental rights 
1 The rights traditionally associated with European citizenship [paragraphs a, b, c and d, Article 
20(2), TFEU] are formally recognised today as fundamental rights in the Charter of  Fundamental 
Rights of  the European Union, which is clear in Articles 45, 39, 40, 46, 44, 43, 41. 
2 Niamh Nic Shuibhne and Jo Shaw, “General report”, in Union Citizenship: Development, Impact and 
Challenges. The XXVI FIDE Congress in Copenhagen 2014, ed. U. Neergaard, C. Jacqueson and N. Holst-
Christensen, Congress Publications, vol. 2 (Copenhagen: DJOF Publishing, 2014), 66: “As both a status 
and an ideal, Union citizenship stands at the interface of  integration and constitutionalism, and is a barometer for key 
trends and influences at the current crossroads between the Member States and the European Union”.
3 See Judgment Grzelczyk, case C-184/99, recital 31. 
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recognised by the Treaties.4 As Eleanor Sharpston has put it, “it may perhaps seem obvious 
that the Court would necessarily bear in mind fundamental rights when interpreting the Treaty’ 
provisions on citizenship of  the Union”,5 whether it states this expressly in its reasoning 
or not. As the former CJEU Judge, José Cunha Rodrigues – rapporteur for some of  
the most relevant judgments on citizenship – claims, the most sensitive effect of  this 
interaction between citizenship and fundamental rights lies in the application of  the 
European Union law in situations that were until then considered as purely internal.6 
This does not mean, of  course, that the notion of  EU citizenship entails, by itself, a 
widening of  the scope of  application of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the 
European Union (CFREU) beyond the boundaries of  EU law.7
However, since the ruling Dereci of  2011,8 the proactiveness of  the CJEU as far 
as the development of  the European citizenship seemed to have gradually exhausted 
its potential, particularly with so-called social citizenship. The CJEU’s pre-Brexit 
case-law on the supposed phenomenon of  “social tourism” (Dano,9 Alimanovic10 and 
finally European Commission v. United Kingdom)11 came up as indefensible and was widely 
criticised by the doctrine.12 Not only because the risk of  “social tourism” was refuted 
a long time ago by statistics released by the European Commission13 – according to 
4 José Cunha Rodrigues, “A propos European citizenship: the right to move and reside freely”, in 
Constitutionalising the EU judicial system: essays in honour of  Pernilla Lindh, ed. Parcal Cordonnel, Allan 
Rosas e Nils Wahl, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2012) 206: “[European citizenship] 
was closely linked to fundamental rights. In a certain sense, the origin and the common destinies of  citizenship and 
fundamental rights constituted the values on which the Union should be based. The perception of  this evolution is essential 
to the interpretation of  current events and to understanding of  the instruments used to date for the broadening of  the 
concept of  European citizenship”.
5 Eleanor Sharpston, “Citizenship and fundamental rights – Pandora’s box or a natural step towards 
maturity?”, in Constitutionalising the EU judicial system: essays in honour of  Pernilla Lindh,  ed. Parcal 
Cordonnel, Allan Rosas and Nils Wahl (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2012) 267: 
“Whilst a civilized society extends the protection afforded by fundamental rights guarantees to all those who are present 
on their territory, this does not alter the fact that the people who (par excellence) have rights – including, of  course, 
fundamental rights – are citizens…Viewed in that light, it becomes clear that it would be unthinkable for the Court to 
interpret the scope and content of  the citizenship provisions of  the Treaty without recourse to fundamental rights”.
6 José Cunha Rodrigues, “Sobre a abundância de direitos em tempo de crise”, Revista de Finanças Públicas e 
Direito Fiscal (2012), 19. 
7 José Luís da Cruz Vilaça and Alessandra Silveira, “The European federalisation process and the 
dynamics of  fundamental rights”, Dimitry Kochenov (ed.), EU citizenship and federalism - the role of  
rights (Cambridge: CUP, 2017).
8 Judgment Dereci, case C-256/11. 
9 Judgment Dano, case C-333/13. 
10 Judgment Alimanovic, case C-67/14. 
11 Judgment European Commission v. United Kingdom, case C-308/14. 
12 See Sandra Mantu and Paul Minderhoud, “Exploring the limits of  social solidarity: welfare 
tourism and EU citizenship”, UNIO - EU Law Journal, vol. 2 (June/2016); Daniela Guimarães, “The 
right of  free movement and the access to social protection in the EU: the economical dimension. 
Notes on the case Elisabeta Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig, C-333/13”, UNIO - EU Law Journal, vol. 1 
(July/2015) (http://www.unio.cedu.direito.uminho.pt). 
13 See the report of  14th of  October 2013 (DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion via DG 
Justice Framework Contract) entitled “A fact finding analysis on the impact on the Member States’ social 
security systems of  the entitlements of  non-active intra-EU migrants to special non-contributory cash benefits and 
healthcare granted on the basis of  residence” and whose summary reads: “it can be concluded that the share of  
non-active intra-EU migrants is very small, they account for a similarly limited share of  SNCB recipients and the 
budgetary impact of  such claims on national welfare budgets is very low. The same is true for costs associated with the 
take-up of  healthcare by this group. Employment remains the key driver for intra-EU migration and activity rates 
among such migrants have indeed increased over the last 7 years”. 
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which the financial impact of  economically inactive citizens is insignificant – but 
mostly because such case-law represents a clear setback in the citizenship acquis, 
resulting from the pressure made by Member States over the European institutions, 
in view of  the populist and xenophobic menaces that increasingly poison national 
public opinions and electoral results.14
In any case, in the current post-Brexit period it has become clearer that access 
to social justice through the CJEU’s case-law, regardless of  the erga omnes effect of  
the decisions under the reference for a preliminary ruling procedure, was not capable 
of  promoting by itself  a global/political consideration of  the issues associated with 
citizenship. Neither did it meet the demands of  the most vulnerable citizens instead of  
only (or mostly) of  the dynamic, economically active citizens. Although the role of  the 
CJEU was indispensable in a given historic time, assuring rights of  social citizenship in 
small doses turned out to be insufficient for the mobilisation of  a political community 
as a whole – and this is what the European Union needs at the present stage of  
integration. The current need is for a qualitative leap from a Union based on the rule 
of  law to a political Union.
And perhaps this is the subliminal message from the CJEU in three post-Brexit 
rulings that, decided in the Grand Chamber, surprisingly recover and develop the 
most emblematic case-law about the European citizenship – namely the Rottmann15 
and Zambrano16 rulings – whose political potential and/or identity potential seemed 
irrevocably muzzled. In the rulings Rendón Marín17 and CS18, the core issue involved 
the expulsion and the automatic refusal of  the concession of  residence to third state 
nationals who have a dependent minor European citizen – in both cases due to the 
parent’s criminal records. The CJEU recovered the Zambrano assertion, according to 
which Article 20 of  the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union (TFEU) 
precludes national provisions that have the effect of  depriving citizens of  the Union 
of  the “genuine enjoyment of  the substance of  the rights conferred by virtue of  their status as citizens 
of  the Union”19 – and, in this sense, it must be attributed the derived right of  residence 
to the national from a third State, under this risk of  the “useful effect of  the European 
citizenship” being affected, if  the minor is forced to leave the territory of  the Union 
to follow his/her parent.20 In both rulings, as we will see, the novelty is the way the 
CJEU appreciates, in the light of  the fundamental rights of  the European citizen, the 
possibility that a Member State may introduce limits to such derived rights of  residence 
which arise from Article 20, TFEU.
In the Petruhhin21 ruling the legal issue was an extradition request presented by 
Russian authorities to Latvian authorities concerning an Estonian national. The 
referring national court basically intended to know whether the lack of  protection for 
Union citizens against extradition, namely when they move to a Member State different 
14 See Alessandra Silveira, “Cidadania social na União Europeia – quo vadis? Avanços e recuos entre 
forças de coesão e fragmentação”, in União Europeia: reforma ou declínio, coord. Eduardo Paz Ferreira 
(Lisboa: Nova Vega, 2016). 
15 Judgment Rottmann, case C-135/08. 
16 Judgment Zambrano, case C-34/09. 
17 Judgment Rendón Marín, case C-165/14. 
18 Judgment CS, case C-304/14. 
19 See Judgment Zambrano, ..., recital 42, Judgment CS, ..., recital 26, Judgment Rendón Marín, ..., recital 71. 
20 See Judgment Zambrano, ..., recitals 43 and 44, Judgment CS, ..., recital 29, Judgment Rendón Marín, ..., 
recital 74. 
21 Judgment Petruhhin, case C-182/15. 
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from the one of  their nationality, would or would not be contrary to the essence of  
the European citizenship – or, more concretely, to the Union citizens’ right to the 
equivalent protection that the host Member States nationals have there. Turning to 
the Rottmann22 ruling, the CJEU recognised that, in the absence of  an international 
agreement between the Union and a third country, the rules in the matter of  extradition 
are within the Member States’ competences, but that does not prevent that in situations 
comprised by the EU law the internal law complies with it.23 Hence, Articles 18 and 21 
of  the TFEU require that the Member State recipient of  an extradition request by a 
third State i) inform the Member State of  the nationality of  the European citizen and 
ii) upon request of  this Member State, surrender its national in compliance with the 
rules of  the Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA (on the European arrest 
warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, as amended by the 
Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA), as long as the Member State of  the nationality 
is competent to criminally proceed against such citizen for acts committed out of  its 
territory.24 The novelty in this case is how the CJEU appreciates, in the light of  the 
fundamental rights of  the European citizen, the possibility that the Member State of  
execution may extradite the national from another Member State at request of  a third 
State.
Such post-Brexit rulings highlight the connection between European citizenship 
and the fundamental rights protection in the EU – which, all considered, the rulings 
Rottmann and Zambrano themselves opted not to point out. They might represent an 
attempt to recover the identity dimension of  the European citizenship, nourished by 
a sense of  belonging to a rights and obligations community. In the absence of  the 
nationality link, the European identity was built upon the exercise of  rights – that is, as 
a “citizenship of  rights”. Yet, the avalanche of  challenges that the EU has been confronted 
with undermined the safe exercise of  fundamental rights – what weakens the mentioned 
link between the Union and its citizens. The dynamics of  European integration depends 
largely on the CJEU case-law, but have been inevitably influenced by political-economic 
dynamics of  each historical moment. The CJEU, in its constitutional court clothing, has 
made “politics by law lines”.25 We will only be able to assess whether this politics is good 
or bad with distance of  time. What remains to be ascertained are the consequences that 
the EU will face for what it sacrificed for the sake of  the United Kingdom – which, 
as we have seen, did not prevent Brexit. Will the CJEU, with its post-Brexit case-law, 
recover the Ariadne’s thread of  identity that will lead it again to the evolving route of  
European citizenship?
II. On the Rottmann judgment and its repercussions on Petruhhin 
Were we to determine the “point of  no-return” in the evolution of  the understanding 
of  the European citizenship, we would by necessity have to indicate the Rottmann 
judgment. As certain as it is that the European citizenship depends on the nationality of  
a Member State and adds to the national citizenship without replacing it – “[e]very person 
holding the nationality of  a Member State shall be a citizen of  the Union” [Article 20(1), TFEU] – 
it is likewise certain that the Rottmann ruling reframes the extension of  the discretionary 
22 See Judgment Rottmann, ..., recital 41. 
23 See Judgment Petruhhin, ..., recitals 26 and 27. 
24 See Judgment Petruhhin, ..., recital 50. 
25 The expression is authored by Gomes Canotilho, referring to the Portuguese constitutional court 
case-law, in Conferência comemorativa do XX aniversário do Tribunal Constitucional, Lisboa, 2003. 
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power Member States have to determine who their citizens are. The acquisition and 
loss of  the nationality (and, therefore, the Union citizenship) are not regulated by the 
EU law. Nonetheless, the conditions of  acquisition and loss of  the nationality must be 
compatible with the European rules and respect the rights and duties of  the European 
citizen, by virtue of  the principle of  European loyalty, evident in article 4(3), TEU.
As the Advocate General Poiares Maduro explains in his opinions on the Rottmann 
judgment, insofar as the possession of  the nationality of  a Member State fixes the 
possession of  Union citizenship – and, thus, the benefit of  rights and freedoms that 
are expressly linked with it as well as the social benefits it allows acceding – Member 
States cannot reject the useful effect of  the obligation of  complying with the EU law 
when they exercise their competences in matters of  nationality.26 In his words:  “[t]
hat obligation is therefore bound to place some restriction on the State act of  depriving a person of  
nationality, when such an act entails the loss of  Union citizenship; otherwise the competence of  the 
Union to determine the rights and duties of  its citizens would be affected”.
The conclusion the CJEU reached in this ruling then shuffles what traditionally 
was understood as primary and secondary in the relations between nationality and 
European citizenship: the maintenance of  the European citizenship demanded the 
maintenance of  the nationality of  a Member State – whether German or Austrian.27 
Moreover, it reveals on which grounds the European citizenship changes, somehow 
unpredictably, the idea of  nationality as basis for citizenship. As of  the moment when 
nationals from other Member State may benefit, in the host Member State, from 
rights previously reserved for their own nationals, the very notion of  nationality as 
main criteria of  belonging is challenged. And it is also challenges the exclusivity of  the 
relation between nationality and citizenship – upon which the Nation-State was built.28
For it, the Rottmann judgment seems to clarify the meaning of  the formulation 
insistently repeated by the CJEU whereby the European citizenship is the “fundamental 
status of  the nationals of  the Member States”. In this process, we must remember, the CJEU 
was confronted with the situation of  an Austrian citizen (from birth) who acquired 
the German nationality (by naturalisation), having lost his original citizenship as a 
consequence. Once the German nationality was fraudulently obtained, Janko Rottmann 
had his naturalisation revoked at German first instance courts – which took the 
Administrative Supreme Court to address the CJEU in order to know if  the statelessness 
and the correspondent loss of  the European citizenship would be compatible with the 
Union law.
It must be noted that in question was not the exercise of  freedoms of  movement 
that would allow the connection with the fundamental rights safeguarded by the 
European legal order29 – Rottmann was a German national living in Germany to whom 
26 See the Opinion AG in the judgment Rottmann, case C-135/08, recital 26. 
27 Eva-Maria Poptcheva, “The multilevel context of  Union citizenship. The right to consular 
protection as a case in point title”, in Citizenship and solidarity in the European Union: from the Charter of  
Fundamental Rights to the crisis, the state of  the art, ed. Alessandra Silveira, Mariana Canotilho and Pedro 
Madeira Froufe (Bruxelles/Bern/Frankfurt am Main/New York/Oxford/Wien: Peter Lang, 2013) 
257: “the multilevel design of  Union citizenship is evidenced by its incursion into nationality rules bringing forward 
the constructive potential of  Union citizenship reflected to some extent in its capacity to penetrate national citizenship. 
This constitutional constructive potential of  Union citizenship found expression for instance in the Rottmann case 
where the Court of  Justice raised the objective dimension of  Union citizenship to a routeing criterion to be observed by 
the Member States when deciding on the withdrawal of  nationality of  a Member State”. 
28 Sandra Mantu, Contingent citizenship. The law and practice of  citizenship deprivation in international, European 
and national perspectives, doctoral dissertation (Nijmegen: Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, 2014), 109. 
29 On the CJEU case-law involving internal norms of  nationality (or directly related to it) in 
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was issued an administrative act from a German authority – but indeed the loss of  the 
European citizenship. The German and the Austrian governments, supported by the 
Commission, claimed that the fact that the interested person had exercised his free 
movement right before the naturalisation could not constitute per se a cross-border 
element susceptible of  influencing the revocation of  such naturalisation.30 It was not 
for any different reason that the Advocate General Poiares Maduro suggested that the 
EU law was not contrary to the loss of  the Union citizenship because the revocation of  
the naturalisation had not been motivated by the exercise of  rights and freedoms arising 
from the Treaties nor it was based on other cause prohibited by the EU law.31
Nevertheless, the CJEU framed the question in other terms, excluding any 
relevance of  the cross-border element – that is, Rottmann’s exercise of  free movement 
in the past – to the preliminary ruling. The CJEU began by rejecting the argument 
of  a purely internal situation. The reasoning was the understanding that the situation 
of  a Union citizen facing a national decision susceptible of  causing the loss of  the 
status of  the European citizenship and its pertaining rights is, by its very nature and its 
consequences, encompassed by the EU law.32 Hence, the fact that nationality matters are 
under the competence of  Member States does not prevent, in circumstances embraced 
by the EU law, the national norms from being as a consequence subject to jurisdictional 
control in light of  the EU law.33
Even if  we accept in principle the legitimacy of  a decision to revoke the fraudulently 
acquired naturalisation (in the light of  international law),34 the CJEU recalled that it is 
up to the judicial organ referencing for a preliminary ruling to evaluate if  the decision 
follows the principle of  proportionality (in the light of  the EU law). Therefore, given the 
importance the primary EU law attributes to the status of  citizenship, the consequences 
for the interested person and potentially his or her relatives of  such a decision should 
be considered, as far as the loss of  rights at disposal of  any European citizen. In this 
respect, it matters essentially to verify whether that loss is justified, considering i) the 
seriousness of  the infraction committed; ii) the time elapsed between the naturalisation 
decision and the revocation decision and iii) the possibility of  the interested one to 
reacquire his/her original nationality. That is why, prior to the decision to revoke the 
naturalisation taking effect, a reasonable time for the person to attempt the reacquisition 
of  the nationality of  the Member State of  origin must be conceded.35
For all those reasons, the CJEU decided in Rottmann that EU law, namely Article 
20, TFEU, is not contrary to a Member State revoking the nationality it granted by 
naturalisation to a Union citizen who obtained it fraudulently, “as long as the decision 
supposed conflict with the freedoms of  movement, see Judgments Airola, Case 21/74; Micheletti, 
Case C-369/90; Garcia Avello, Case C-148/02; and Grunkin and Paul, Case C-353/06. 
30 See Judgment Rottmann, ..., recital 38. 
31 See the Opinion AG in the judgment Rottmann, ..., recital 35. 
32 See Judgment Rottmann, ..., recital 42. 
33 See Judgment Rottmann, ..., recitals 41, 45 and 48; Opinion AG in the judgment Rendón Marín and 
CS, cases. C-165/14 e C-304/14, recitals 113 and 114. 
34 See Judgment Rottmann, ..., recitals 52 and 54. The CJEU refers to the Convention on the 
reduction of  Statelessness, whose Article 8(2) states that an individual can be deprived of  the 
nationality of  a contracting State if  he has obtained it through false declarations or any other 
fraudulent act. Likewise, Article 7(1)(3) of  the European Convention on Nationality does not 
prohibit a signatory state of  depriving an individual of  his nationality, even if  he becomes stateless, 
when it was acquired following fraudulent acts, through false information or concealment of  any 
relevant facts attributed to the applicant. 
35 See Judgment Rottmann, ..., recitals 55 to 58. 
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to revoke complies with the principle of  proportionality”, under the terms defined by the 
EU law.36 And it concluded by reiterating that the principles related to the Member 
State’s competence in matters of  nationality – especially the obligation to exercise this 
competence in accordance with the Union law – are applicable both to the Member 
State of  naturalisation (in this case, Germany) and the Member State of  the original 
nationality (in this case, Austria).37
What is striking in the Rottmann judgment as far as the evolution of  the citizenship 
acquis is above all the disregard towards the previous movement of  Rottmann and 
the circumscription of  the issue under the Article 20, TFEU, thus contributing to the 
definition of  the scope of  application of  the European citizenship. In spite of  Rottmann 
having moved in the past, from Austria to Germany – thus exercising his freedom of  
movement – his situation was appreciated as if  he had been a static citizen (and not 
dynamic), and his status of  citizenship was defended in this fashion. Besides serving 
to refute the argument of  a purely internal situation, European citizenship served as 
a foundation to safeguard the rights and freedoms of  a static citizen – something that 
would later be confirmed in the Zambrano judgment, published in the following year 
(see below).38 
As the Advocate General Maciej Szpunar explains in his recent opinions for Rendón 
Marín and CS, the likeness between the situation of  Rottmann, subject to provoking the 
“loss of  the status conferred by Article (20, TFEU) and the relating rights” and that of  one of  
Zambrano’s descendants (susceptible to depriving the genuine “enjoyment of  the substance 
of  the rights conferred by virtue of  their status as citizens of  the Union”) is no simple coincidence, 
as both concepts have similar extents. The concept of  “the substance of  the rights” used by 
the CJEU hints at the concept of  “essential substance of  rights”, particularly fundamental 
rights, well-known to the constitutional traditions of  the Member States as well as to 
the European Union law. All in all, Article 52(1), CFREU admits the introduction of  
limits to the exercise of  rights, as long as those limits are legally provided for, observe 
the essential content of  such rights and freedoms and, pursuant the principle of  
proportionality, are necessary and effectively match the objectives of  general interest 
recognised by the Union, or the need to protect rights and freedoms of  third parties. 
In that sense, the Advocate General concludes, the respect of  the essential rights that 
derives from the fundamental status of  citizen of  the Union operates, as in the case of  
respect for the essential content of  fundamental rights, “as [a] last and insurmountable limit 
to any possible restriction to the exercise of  rights associated to it”, or in other words, as a “limit 
of  limits”.39
Thus, in the same way that European citizenship served in the Rottmann judgment 
to enclose the national competences of  revocation of  a fraudulent naturalisation, in 
the Petruhhin judgment it serves to curb the extradition of  European citizens to third 
countries with which the European Union has not signed an international convention. 
As seen, the European citizenship emerged to promote the levelling trend of  the juridical 
positions of  the nationals of  Member States irrespective of  where they find themselves. 
The principle of  non-discrimination on grounds of  nationality (Article 18, TFEU) is 
by force of  the Treaties indissociably tied to citizenship status. It is for no other reason 
that Part II of  the TFEU is entitled “non-discrimination and citizenship of  the Union”. For it, 
36 See Judgment Rottmann, ..., recital 59. 
37 See Judgment Rottmann, ..., recital 62.  
38 See Opinion AG Rendón Marín and CS, cases C-165/14 and C-304/14, recital 115.  
39 See Opinion AG Rendón Marín and CS, ..., recitals 126 to 130. 
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the CJEU’s case-law has recognised juridical-constitutional characteristics in the current 
Article 18, TFEU which have been revealed as faithful to the economy of  the Treaty 
and more suitable to the European construction.40 As the former CJEU Judge José 
Cunha Rodrigues explains, such constitutional dimension, based on a new juridical-
political reality and oriented to the recognition of  rights, has marked the transition 
from the personal status of  simple recipient of  norms into the centre of  reference in 
the process of  the European construction.41 Indeed, the perception of  this evolution is 
essential for interpreting the present and understanding the instruments used so far in 
the densification of  the concept of  European citizenship.42
Under this premise of  intrinsic relation between citizenship and non-
discrimination, in the Petruhhin ruling the referring jurisdictional organ asks the CJEU 
if  Articles 18 and 21, TFEU ought to be interpreted in such a way that, for application 
effects of  an extradition agreement negotiated between a Member State and a third 
State, the nationals of  another Member State should benefit from the rule that forbids 
the extradition of  nationals of  the host Member State. In forbidding “any discrimination 
on grounds of  nationality”, Article 18, TFEU imposes equal treatment towards persons 
who find themselves in a situation comprehended in the scope of  application of  the 
Treaties.43 In the main lawsuit, by moving to Latvia, the Estonian national Petruhhin 
exercised his freedoms of  movement. Therefore the situation in question is within 
the scope of  application of  the Treaties in the significance given by Article 18, TFEU. 
Consequently, the unequal treatment in allowing the extradition of  a Union citizen 
who is a national of  another Member State consists of  a restriction to his/her freedom 
of  movement under the Article 21, TFEU.44
What is effectively relevant in the Petruhhin judgement, though, is the recognition 
that in the domain of  extradition to third countries, EU Member States’ nationals access 
the Union’s fundamental law standard through European citizenship, which assures a 
higher level of  protection, including against his/her own state of  nationality in case 
it admits the extradition of  nationals to third countries. The CJEU decided that if  an 
addressed Member State intends to extradite a national of  another Member State upon 
request from a third country it must be verified if  the extradition infringes the rights 
enshrined in Article 19, CFREU. The CJEU has also established the criteria for such 
verification. According to Article 19, CFREU, no one may be removed, expelled or 
extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the 
death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. That 
is why the CJEU points out that the accession to international human rights treaties 
are not sufficient per se to ensure a proper protection against the risk of  degrading 
treatment when trustworthy sources report practises manifestly contrary to human 
rights perpetrated by the addressing authorities of  the extradition – or are tolerated 
by them. In order to assess the real risk in this regard, the competent authority in the 
addressed Member State must ground its decision on objective, reliable, precise and duly 
updated elements – that may result namely from judicial rulings and other documents 
40 See José Cunha Rodrigues, “Comentário ao artigo 45.º da CDFUE”, in Carta dos Direitos 
Fundamentais da União Europeia Comentada, ed. Alessandra Silveira and Mariana Canotilho (Coimbra: 
Almedina, 2013), 525. 
41 Idem.
42 Idem. 
43 See Judgment Petruhhin, ..., recital 29. 
44 See Judgment Petruhhin, ..., recital 33. 
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prepared by organs of  the  Council of  Europe or part of  the United Nations system.45
In the light of  the Rottman-Zambrano case-law – and in spite of  the CJEU not 
referring to it in Petruhhin as it had done in Rottmann – the principles relating to the 
Member States’ competence in extradition matters, especially the obligation to observe 
European Union law, are binding insofar as the addressed Member State (in this case, 
Latvia) and to the Member State of  the nationality (in this case, Estonia). Therefore, 
the CJEU recalls that, in lieu of  EU law rules regulating the extradition between the 
Member States and a third country, it matters to preserve Union’s citizens from measures 
susceptible of  depriving them of  their citizenship rights. That should be done by using 
all existing mechanisms of  cooperation and mutual assistance in criminal matters due 
to the European Union law46 and then preventing, as much as possible, the risk of  the 
infraction at stake going unpunished.47
III. On the Zambrano judgment and its repercussions on Rendón 
Marín and CS  
The Rottmann judgment opened the way for the Zambrano ruling, such that the 
CJEU could sustain the interpretation (even though this is not explicit in the reasoning) 
that static European citizens, who have never moved and only lived in one Member 
State, could benefit from the European jus-fundamentality standard via the status of  
European citizenship. As the Advocate General Eleanor Sharpston explains in her 
opinion in the Zambrano judgment, it would be (to say the least) paradoxical that a 
European citizen could invoke the fundamental rights protected by the Union i) when 
he/she exercises economic freedoms, ii) when he/she invokes the secondary law of  the 
Union, or iii) when the national law applicable integrates the scope of  application of  
the Treaties; but he/she would not be able to do it when simply remaining in his/her 
Member State of  birth – via European citizenship alone. The right to reside established 
in Article 21, TFEU must be considered autonomous, “rather than a right that is linked by 
some legal umbilical cord to the right to move”.48
Indeed, the referred questions articulated by the national judge in Zambrano clearly 
related European citizenship to fundamental rights.49 Therefore, the core issue in the 
Zambrano judgment was the definition of  i) the scope of  application of  fundamental 
rights in the European Union and ii) the access of  the citizens to a jus-fundamentality 
standard such that an inadmissible unequal treatment between so-called dynamic citizens 
(who exercise their classic European rights/economic freedoms and, for that reason, 
would benefit from the European jus-fundamentality standard) and static citizens (who 
do not exercise freedoms of  movement and thus do not benefit from the European 
jus-fundamentality standard). In Zambrano, the CJEU faced the impact of  fundamental 
rights (particularly the right of  protection of  family life) in the definition of  the 
meaning and the reach of  the European citizenship. The CJEU was challenged to give 
45 See Judgment Petruhhin, ..., recitals 53 to 60. 
46 See Judgment Petruhhin, ..., recital 47. 
47 See Judgment Petruhhin, ..., recital 49. 
48 See Opinion AG Zambrano, Case C-34/09, recital 84. 
49 See Opinion AG Zambrano, ..., recital 52: “The national court has made it very plain in the order for 
reference that it seeks guidance as to whether the fundamental right to family life plays a role in the present case, where 
neither the Union citizen nor his Colombian parents have moved outside Belgium. That question raises in turn a 
more basic question: what is the scope of  EU fundamental rights? Can they be relied upon independently? Or must 
there be some point of  attachment to another, classic, EU right?” 
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a practical utility to the European citizenship, essentially concerning the protection of  
fundamental rights in the Union. In other words, the CJEU was compelled to convert 
European citizenship into a platform that permits the access of  a national of  a Member 
State to the European jus-fundamentality standard. In that way, it prevented the citizen 
to look for fictional or hypothetical nexus with the freedoms of  movement in order to 
benefit from the jus-fundamental standard.50
Had we to identify what the Zambrano case-law adds to the citizenship acquis, we 
could argue that after this ruling arises that i) the European citizenship is not subject 
to the previous exercise of  a freedom of  movement and ii) through the European 
citizenship it is possible to go into the European jus-fundamentality standard when 
there is no other evident link with the European Union law. For this reason Zambrano 
carries the germ of  a theory of  the fundamental rights in the European Union to 
the degree that it confronts the European legal order with everything that is most 
unsettling in the domain of  fundamental rights protection in a Union (reputedly) based 
on the rule of  law.
The factual situation that is behind such case-law evolution is largely known: 
a Colombian couple arrived in Belgium in 1999 with a visa issued by the Belgian 
authorities in Bogota with the expectation to get asylum after receiving death threats 
by private militias and having faced the kidnap of  their three year-old son for a week. 
The Belgian authorities deny them asylum but do not repatriate them – considering the 
civil war situation in the country of  origin. Afterwards a saga of  systematically denied 
residence authorisation requests followed. In the meantime, the two Belgian children of  
the Zambrano couple are born. In concrete terms it mattered, therefore, to know if  the 
rules of  the TFEU concerning the European citizenship confer the parent of  a minor 
European citizen the right of  residence in the Member State of  which his/her child is 
a national. In broader terms it was the case for testing the extension of  the citizenship 
(which rights does it imply?) of  a static European citizen (who has never exercised 
freedom of  movement, having never left the Member State where he/she was born 
and of  which he or she is a national).
All governments that presented written observations to the Court – and also the 
Commission – alleged that it was a purely internal situation. Insofar as the Belgian 
children of  the Zambrano couple reside in the Member State of  their nationality and 
never left it, to them the freedoms of  movement and residence fixed by European 
Union law would not be applicable. Nor would the higher level of  protection of  
fundamental right to family life to which they would have access via the exercise of  
those freedoms. Ruiz Zambrano contested this argument by stating that the exercise of  
European citizenship does not presuppose the movement of  his children to the outside 
of  the Member State where they reside – thereby he could invoke himself, as a member 
of  the family, the right to reside pursuant the European Union law.51
In order to illustrate the incoherence of  insisting on the requirement of  a physical 
movement to a different Member State from the one of  which someone is a national 
before invoking the right of  residence as a Union citizen, the Advocate General 
Eleanor Sharpston projected the following hypothetical situation in her opinion in the 
Zambrano judgment: “[s]uppose a friendly neighbour had taken Diego and Jessica on a visit or 
two to Parc Astérix in Paris, or to the seaside in Brittany. They would then have received services in 
another Member State. Were they to seek to claim rights arising from their ‘movement’ it could not be 
50 See Opinion AG Zambrano, ..., recital 167. 
51 See Judgment Zambrano, ..., recital 38. 
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suggested that their situation was ‘purely internal’ to Belgium. Would one visit have sufficed? Two? 
Several? Would a day trip have been enough; or would they have had to stay over for a night or two 
in France?”.52 And she goes on: “[i]t is difficult to avoid a sense of  unease at such an outcome. 
Lottery rather than logic would seem to be governing the exercise of  EU citizenship rights”.53 For that 
reason the Advocate General defended that the Zambrano’s children’s rights derived 
from the EU citizenship would be susceptible of  being invoked notwithstanding the 
fact that the children had not left yet the Member State of  which they were nationals 
(and as a consequence, Ruiz Zambrano could invoke a right of  residence derived from 
his children’s rights as EU citizens).
Underlying the argument enunciated by Ruiz Zambrano is a reframing of  the 
notion of  what a purely internal situation is (understood as a situation without any 
connection to European Union law) whose original meaning has weaknesses in the 
current stage of  the integration. When scrutinising similar situations, the CJEU opines 
about the application of  EU law in situations that are in principle internal (because 
they relate to internal products, in internal market conditions and in compliance with 
internal rules) but susceptible to presenting a link with situations subject to European 
Union law. As explained by the Advocate General Eleanor Sharpston, the question of  
knowing if  a situation is internal is conceptually distinct to the question of  knowing if  
there is a connection with the European Union law. It matters which situations, internal 
or not, should be considered as not having any link with the European Union law. Yet, 
the answer cannot be that the so-called “internal situations” are automatically stripped of  
any connection to the European Union law.54 
It is not surprising, then, that the concrete situation in Zambrano raised the 
following perplexities in the national court: i) is it necessary for movement to take 
place for TFEU rules on European citizenship to be applicable?; ii) does Article 18, 
TFEU protect static citizens against inverse discrimination caused by the exercise of  
citizenship rights by dynamic citizens?; iii) what role do the fundamental rights play in 
determining the meaning and the reach of  the European citizenship? In response, the 
CJEU upheld Ruiz Zambrano’s claim in half  a dozen recitals whose historical relevance 
cannot be measured in this ruling with rapporteur by José Cunha Rodrigues.
The CJEU began by recognising that the Directive 2004/38/CE did not apply in 
the main proceedings. This Directive is only applicable to EU citizens who move or 
reside in a Member State that is not the one of  their nationality – and it was not the case. 
There was not, thus, an exercise of  freedoms of  movement. However, the status of  EU 
citizen (Article 20, TFEU) hinders national actions that have the effect of  depriving the 
European citizens of  the genuine enjoyment conferred by such status.55 The refusal of  
residence of  a national from a third country that is responsible for European citizens 
in their early age ends up producing this effect: if  the children were to be obliged to 
leave the territory of  the European Union they would be prevented of  exercising the 
substance of  the rights assured by the status of  citizens of  the Union.56 It cannot be 
otherwise since the access to fundamental rights in the Union must not depend on the 
exercise of  freedoms of  movement nor the European Union should go along the idea 
52 See Opinion AG Zambrano, ..., recital 86. 
53 See Opinion AG Zambrano, ..., recital 88. 
54 See Opinion AG Government of  the French Community and Walloon Government v Flemish Government 
Case C-212/06, recital 136. 
55 See Judgment Zambrano, ..., recital 42. 
56 See Judgment Zambrano, ..., recital 44. 
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that only economically active citizens are entitled to the protection of  family life.
Recently, in the judgments Rendón Marín and CS, the CJEU recovers the Zambrano 
case-law and further develops it as it appreciates in the light of  the fundamental rights of  
the European citizen the possibility of  limits over such derived right of  residence which 
result from Article 20, TFEU. In the CS judgment the United Kingdom government 
disputed that the practise of  a criminal infraction by the parent with the effect custody 
of  the European citizen could exclude him of  the scope of  protection defined in 
the Zambrano ruling. It alleged that the decision to remove CS was based on public 
order grounds because he/she represented a clear threat to a legitimate interest of  
that Member State, namely the respect for social cohesion and the values of  its society. 
Moreover, Articles 27 and 28 of  the Directive 2004/38 provide for the possibility of  
the Member States to expel from their territories a citizen of  the Union who commits 
a criminal infraction. In that regard, not acknowledging the limits of  a derived right of  
residence that results directly from Article 20, TFEU would be to admit, according to 
the United Kingdom, that a national of  a third country has a higher protection against 
the removal from the territory of  the Union than a European citizen. Consequently, a 
Member State should be given the right of  i) derogating the derived right of  residence 
that results from Article 20, TFEU and ii) expelling from its territory the national of  a 
third country if  a criminal infraction of  some seriousness is committed. That is so even 
if  it implies that a minor and European citizen has to leave the territory of  the Union.
In both rulings Rendón Marín and CS – in fact published on the same day – the 
CJEU adopted an identical reasoning, though in the first case the question was about 
the refusal to concede a residence permit and in the second, the removal from the 
territory of  a Member State always in accordance with the criminal records of  the 
parents. The CJEU considered that Article 20, TFEU did not affect the possibility 
that the Member States might invoke an exception linked with the maintenance of  
the public order and the safeguarding of  public security. Yet, those concepts ought to 
be understood in a strict sense, wherefore its reach cannot be determined unilaterally 
by each of  the Member States without control by the Union’s institutions. All in all, 
the CJEU has interpreted that the concept of  “public order” presupposes, in any case, 
besides the disturbance of  the social order that all legal infraction causes, the existence 
of  a real, current and sufficiently serious threat against a fundamental interest of  the 
society. Only in these circumstances is the expulsion decision compliant with European 
Union law. This conclusion cannot be reached automatically only based on the criminal 
records of  interested parties. It can only result from a concrete appreciation by the 
referring court of  all current and appropriate circumstances of  the case under analysis, 
in light of  the principle of  proportionality, of  the best interest of  the child and the 
fundamental rights whose respect is ascertained by the CJEU. Such appreciation must 
take into consideration i) the behaviour of  the interested, ii) the length and the legal 
character of  the residence in the territory of  the Member State, iii) the nature and 
the seriousness of  the infraction committed, iv) the current degree of  danger of  the 
interested party to society, v) the age of  the child and his/her health condition and vi) 
his/her respective economic and family situation.57 
As the situation of  CS is encompassed by the European Union law, its appreciation 
must take into account the right to respect for private and family life, as laid down in 
Article 7, CFREU. This right has to be read in conjunction with the obligation of  
considering the best interest of  the child, enshrined in Article 24(2) of  the Charter. 
57 See Judgment CS, ..., recital 42 and Judgment Rendón Marín, ..., recital 86. 
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As seen, the mere existence of  criminal records cannot justify an expulsion order 
susceptible of  depriving the descendants of  third country nationals from the genuine 
enjoyment of  the rights granted by the status of  citizen of  the Union. In this way, 
in both judgments, the CJEU concluded that Article 20, TFEU is to be interpreted 
as meaning that it precludes the legislation of  a Member State which imposes i) 
the expulsion of  a third country national who was criminally convicted58 and ii) the 
automatic refusal of  the concession of  a residence permit to a third country national by 
the simple reason that the interested person has a criminal record,59 even if  the parent 
in question provides the effective custody of  minors of  early age, who are nationals of  
this Member State, where they have resided since birth without having exercised their 
free movement rights, when the above-mentioned expulsion or refusal of  residence 
permit obligate the children to leave the territory of  the Union, stripping them of  the 
genuine enjoyment of  their citizenship rights.
IV. Conclusion
Since the delivery of  the Zambrano judgment we have been arguing that the CJEU 
has found in European citizenship the definitive link to the safeguarding of  the higher 
level of  fundamental rights protection that it is its duty to guarantee by virtue of  Article 
53, CFREU. If  European citizenship (and the rights it contains) falls within the scope 
of  material application of  the European Union law, it allows that the fundamental 
rights protected by the European Union are invoked by the European citizen without 
any other nexus with European Union law beyond the citizenship itself. The basic 
rationale underlying this argument is the following: i) the situation of  a citizen of  the 
Union who did not use the freedom of  movement alone cannot be considered free of  
connection with the European Union law;60 ii) the status of  citizen of  the Union tends 
to be the fundamental status of  the Member States nationals – what permits to invoke, 
even concerning the Member State of  nationality, the corresponding rights of  such 
status;61 iii) if  the referring court considers that the situation sub judice is encompassed 
by the European Union law via European citizenship, it must examine whether the 
fundamental rights are respected as the Union legal order values them.62
All considered, the CJEU has attempted to clarify that the goal of  the protection 
of  fundamental rights in the European Union law is to care that such rights are not 
infringed in the domains of  activity of  the Union, either as a consequence of  action by 
the Union or of  the application of  the European Union law by the Member States.63 
In the Court’s view, the pursuit of  this objective is justified by the need of  avoiding 
that the fundamental rights protection, sensitive to the national law at stake, harms the 
unity, primacy and effectiveness of  the European Union law.64 The CJEU establishes, 
therefore, a clear connection between the fundamental rights protection – as the 
CFREU shapes them – and the imperative of  effectiveness of  the European Union law. 
What is manifest here is the idea that dissonances in the fundamental rights protection 
in the different Member States can compromise the legal equality of  the European 
58 See Judgment CS, ..., recital 50. 
59 See Judgment Rendón Marín, ..., recital 87. 
60 See Judgment Dereci, ..., recital 61. 
61 See Judgment Dereci, ..., recitals 62 e 63. 
62 See Judgment Dereci, ..., recital 72. 
63 See Judgment Siragusa, Case C-206/13, recital 31. 
64 Idem. 
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citizens – and ultimately the very survival of  a Union based on the rule of  law.
In fact, it is not anything new, but simply the application, in the scope of  the 
citizenship and the fundamental rights it implies, of  the renowned formula of  the 
internal market visible in the Dassonville judgment.65 Any national action which may 
harm intra-community commerce produces an effect equivalent to quantitative 
restrictions and is therefore prohibited. Thus, either in the scope of  application of  the 
internal market or the European citizenship, the CJEU establishes the links with the 
European Union law as of  the effectiveness of  the rights in question, focusing on the 
negative effects/impacts (current or potential) that the controversial national measure 
provokes in the rights of  the individuals.66 What is at stake, then, is ability or inability 
of  benefiting from the rights associated with European citizenship. The European 
Union law will apply insofar as the substance of  those rights is under threat. Even 
though European citizenship does not enlarge the scope of  material application of  the 
Treaties to internal situations without connection with the European Union law,67 such 
a connection is (necessarily) created upon the negative effects that the national actions 
might cause over it.
That is why the Advocate General Maciej Szpunar recalls that the Zambrano 
judgment belong within a case-law logic that aims at the recognition of  rights claimed 
by nationals of  Member States who, as citizens of  the Union, express their need of  legal 
protection and their request for integration not only in the host Member State but also 
in their own Member State. Indeed, the fact that Member States nationals also have a 
status as fundamental as that of  European citizenship implies that the European Union 
law precludes national actions that have the effect of  depriving them of  the genuine 
enjoyment of  the substance of  the rights conferred by virtue of  this status.68Affirming 
that Member State nationals are citizens of  the Union creates expectations by defining 
rights and obligations.69 In the post-Brexit judgments, the CJEU has seemed to recover 
that stance with new vigour. It is its competence to do so, in order for the European 
citizenry in general (but especially those are static, the vast majority) feel they are not 
abandoned to their own destinies and, consequently, more vulnerable to the populism 
and xenophobia that haunt the European Union. Unfortunately, Europe is not free of  
the eruption of  a collective bestiality. Its culture and civilisation, as Freud explained, are 
like a thin layer always in danger of  being upended at any time by the destructive forces 
of  the underground world.70
65 Judgment Dassonville, Case 8/74. 
66 Jože Štrus and Nina Peršak, “The Charter of  Fundamental Rights and EU citizenship: the link 
with EU Law re-examined”, in The Reconceptualization of  European Union citizenship, ed. Elspeth Guild, 
Cristina Gortázar and Dora Kostakopoulou (Leiden/Boston: Brill Nijhoof  Publishers, 2014), 326. 
67 See Judgments Uecker, joint cases C-64/96 and C-65/96, recital 23; García Avello, ..., recital 26; 
Schempp, Case C-403/03, recital 20. 
68 See Opinion AG Rendón Marín and CS, ..., recital 116. 
69 See Opinion AG Rendón Marín and CS, ..., recital 117. 
70 See Stefan Zweig, O mundo de ontem: recordações de um europeu (Porto: Assírio & Alvim, 2014) 22. 
